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Economic incentives to harvest a species usually diminish as its abundance declines, because harvest costs increase. This prevents har-
vesting to extinction. A known exception can occur if consumer demand causes a declining species’ harvest price to rise faster than costs.
This threat may affect rare and valuable species, such as large land mammals, sturgeons, and bluefin tunas. We analyze a similar but un-
derappreciated threat, which arises when the geographic area (range) occupied by a species contracts as its abundance declines. Range
contractions maintain the local densities of declining populations, which facilitates harvesting to extinction by preventing abundance de-
clines from causing harvest costs to rise. Factors causing such range contractions include schooling, herding, or flocking behaviors–which,
ironically, can be predator-avoidance adaptations; patchy environments; habitat loss; and climate change. We use a simple model to identify
combinations of range contractions and price increases capable of causing extinction from profitable overharvesting, and we compare these
to an empirical review. We find that some aquatic species that school or forage in patchy environments experience sufficiently severe range
contractions as they decline to allow profitable harvesting to extinction even with little or no price increase; and some high-value declining
aquatic species experience severe price increases. For terrestrial species, the data needed to evaluate our theory are scarce, but available
evidence suggests that extinction-enabling range contractions may be common among declining mammals and birds. Thus, factors causing
range contraction as abundance declines may pose unexpectedly large extinction risks to harvested species.
Anthropogenic Allee Effect | hyperstable | endangered species | poaching
Harvesting has driven the population declines of thousands of species of animals and plants [1], but it is thought to rarelycause extinction because the increasing cost of harvesting a progressively rarer species would eventually exceed the value
of the harvest, and harvesting would stop [2]. However, for species harvested for high-value products, there is concern that
their depletion could fuel price increases, via market demand, large enough to compensate for higher harvest costs and thereby
maintain profit-incentives to harvest all the way to extinction, absent management intervention [3]. Courchamp et al. [3] term
this threat the ‘Anthropogenic Allee Effect’.
Species thought to face this threat include those harvested, both legally and illegally, for trophies (e.g., large terrestrial
mammals including rhinoceros, elephants and large cats [4–8]), for collections (e.g., stag beetles [9]), for body parts regarded
as having medicinal or aphrodisiac properties (e.g., many large mammals [4]), or for luxury foods (e.g., sturgeons, bluefin
tunas, sea cucumbers [10–12]). Many such species are considered threatened by the Red List of the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) [1] or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) [13]. Expanding human populations, coupled with economic growth in developing countries with large luxury harvest
markets, may increase pressures on these species in coming decades [12].
A similar threat of extinction from overharvesting would occur if a species’ harvest costs failed to rise as its abundance
declined, thus maintaining harvesting profitability. One way this can occur is if the geographic area (range) occupied by the
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Fig. 1. Profitable harvesting to extinction (Courchamp et al.’s [3] ‘Anthropogenic Allee Effect’) under open access occurs when, at harvest levels at which abundance is not
changing, harvest price (red, nonlinear due to density-dependent population growth) is greater than harvest cost (blue) as abundance approaches zero. Such conditions either
can result in alternative stable states (panel A)–a tipping-point abundance (open circle) separates domains of attraction of a positive equilibrium abundance (filled circle) and
extinction–or can cause profits to be positive at any abundance and make extinction the only possible outcome of open-access harvesting (panel B).
species contracts as its abundance declines, thereby maintaining its local population density. This pattern has been noted in
several fish and aquatic invertebrate populations [14, 15] and may have contributed to the famous 1990s collapse of northern
cod (Gadus morhua) [16]. In fish and invertebrates, range contraction is often observed in declining populations that exhibit
schooling behavior (to maintain school sizes) and/or forage in patchy environments (because populations concentrate in the
preferred habitats) [14, 15, 17]. Habitat destruction and climate change can also cause range contraction, and thus might
similarly buffer harvest costs against population declines and create incentives for harvesting to extinction.
These overharvesting threats from range contraction and market demand likely interact (Fig. 1). For example, prices
would not need to be very sensitive (‘flexible’) to abundance declines to allow profitable harvesting to extinction if costs were
insensitive to abundance declines because of range contraction.
Here, we theoretically and empirically characterize this interaction. We use a simple model to illustrate conditions under
which range contraction and price flexibility can in combination allow harvesting to extinction under open access. We then
review available empirical evidence in order to shed light on where these biological and economic risk factors may be most
acute. While many harvests are now managed [18], it is nonetheless important to understand the threats posed by open-access
incentives due to the pervasiveness of illegal and unreported harvesting of endangered species [4, 7, 8].
Theory
We consider the following model of open-access harvesting on a single population with abundance N . The population has
a per-capita growth rate, denoted g(N), which follows negative density-dependence (g′[N ] < 0) and has a maximum of r
(g[0] = r). The population is harvested at rate Y , which is a function of the current harvest effort, E, and abundance (N);
there is no harvest if either abundance or effort is zero:
Y = Y (N,E), Y (0, E) = Y (N, 0) = 0. [1]
The population’s rate of change, denoted N˙ ≡ dN/dt, is:
N˙ = Ng(N)− Y . [2]
Under open access, the rate of change in effort, E˙ ≡ dE/dt, has the same sign as harvest profits [2], i.e.:
E˙ >(<) 0 if p >(<) c, E˙ = 0 if p = c, [3]
where p and c are respectively the price and average cost of a unit of harvest received/incurred by harvesters.
Extinction condition. Harvesting to extinction can occur in this model if and only if, as abundance (N) approaches 0, there is
still upward pressure on effort (i.e. E˙ > 0) when harvest rates (Y ) exactly balance population growth (Ng[N ]) (i.e. abundance
is not changing, N˙ = 0) (illustrated in Supporting Information [SI] Fig. S1). Formally, this means that extinction can occur if
and only if:
lim
N→0
(
p
c
)
|Y=Ng(N) > 1. [4]
Prices, costs, and abundance. We assume that the sensitivity of the price (p) to changes in abundance (N) is mediated by
changes in the supply of harvest in the market–equal to the harvest rate, Y . The sensitivity of a harvest product’s price to its
supply is commonly measured by the ’price flexibility of demand’ [19, 20], denoted f , defined as:
∂p
∂Y
(
Y
p
)
= −f , [5]
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i.e. price increases by f percent when supply (Y ) declines by one percent. Price flexibility is related to, but distinct from, the
more widely known concept of demand elasticity; they are reciprocals in a market with only one good, but not otherwise [19].
We use price flexibility, because it is considered a more appropriate empirical demand measure for harvests (e.g. [20]).
Assuming constant price flexibility (f), eq. (5) implies that the price (p) is given by:
p = ρY −f , [6]
where ρ is either a constant or a function of variables other than supply (Y ). In the analysis that follows, we assume ρ is
constant, but discuss alternate assumptions below in Other considerations and in the SI Materials and Methods.
To model the relationship between average costs (c) and abundance (N), we assume the harvest rate (Y ) at a given time is
proportional to the harvesting effort (E) (i.e. constant returns to scale) multiplied by the population abundance (N) raised to
a constant power, β (sensu [21, 22]):
Y = qNβE; [7]
q is also a constant. β represents the percent change in catch-per-unit effort (CPUE = Y/E) resulting from a one-percent
change in abundance (N), and thus can be thought of as the ’catch flexibility’. If β < 1, then CPUE is ’hyperstable’ because it
changes proportionally more slowly than abundance [21].
For simplicity we assume that effort has a constant cost, and that the units of effort are such that they have unit costs (i.e.
total cost = E). The average unit cost of harvest (c = E/Y ), is then given by [from eq. 7]:
c = q−1N−β . [8]
We briefly discuss alternate assumptions in Other considerations and in the SI Materials and Methods.
Extinction condition revisited. With equations 6 and 8 for p and c, extinction condition 4 becomes:
lim
N→0
(
p
c
)
|Y=Ng(N) =
{ 0 f < β
ρqr−f f = β
∞ f > β
}
> 1, [9]
implying (Fig. S1; intuition discussed below and illustrated in Fig. 1) that extinction can occur if and only if:
f > β, or f = β and ρqr−f > 1. [10]
If price flexibility exceeds catch flexibility (f > β), then two scenarios are possible (depending on parameter values) under
open access: (i) extinction is the only possible outcome (Fig. 1B; light-red E isocline in Fig. S1D); (ii) there is an unstable
equilibrium acting as a tipping point separating a basin of attraction of extinction and a basin of attraction of either a stable
(positive) equilibrium or limit cycle (Fig. 1A; dark-red E isocline in Fig. S1D). In contrast, if f = β and ρqr−f > 1, only
extinction is possible (light-red E isocline in Fig. S1E).
Range contraction. Under random search, CPUE would be proportional to population density (abundance [N ]/range area [A]),
i.e. Y ∝
(
N
A
)
E, and catch flexibility (β) would then be determined solely by the relationship between abundance (N) and
range area (A): β = 1 − ∂A
∂N
(
N
A
)
. In practice, other factors (e.g., technology, harvester search skill) tend to further buffer
CPUE as abundance declines ([15, 23]; see Fig. 2, Dataset S1 for many examples), meaning that,
β ≤ 1− ∂A
∂N
(
N
A
)
. [11]
Intuition. The intuition of our theory is as follows: A one-percent decrease in abundance (N) of a rare species increases average
costs by β percent and increases price by approximately f percent. If f > β, the incentive to keep harvesting only increases;
if f = β, it fails to decrease (and it is positive if ρqr−f > 1). If range (A) contracts proportionally as fast as or faster than
abundance declines (i.e. ∂A
∂N
(
N
A
)
≥ 1⇒ β ≤ 0), then incentives to harvest are maintained even with constant prices (f = 0),
and range contraction therefore poses an extinction threat on its own [16, 23]. Similarly, if prices rise proportionally as fast or
faster than supply falls (i.e. f ≥ 1), then incentives to harvest are maintained even with no range contraction (i.e. β = 1), and
price flexibility poses an extinction threat on its own. The most common case, as we will see below, is where 0 < β, f < 1–one
where price flexibility and range contraction (and/or other factors making costs insensitive to declines) can only pose threats in
combination.
Other considerations. Other factors beyond price and catch flexibilities can impact the changes in costs or prices coincident
with changes in abundance. These include economies of scale (meaning ∂Y
∂E
(
E
Y
)
> 1) (e.g. [24]), technology and technological
change (meaning dq/dt > 0) [25], supply-independent increasing trends in price (e.g., caused by income growth) (meaning
∂ρ/∂t > 0), and supply-independent effects of abundance on prices caused by ’rarity value’ [3, 26]) (∂ρ/∂N < 0).
These other effects are not the focus of the present study, but we show in SI Materials and Methods the direction in which
each of these effects is likely to impact extinction threats: Technological change, positive supply-independent price trends,
and rarity value each exacerbate the threats (though supply-independent rarity effects on prices may be negligibly small in
comparison to supply effects [measured by f ] for species already rare enough for their harvest products to confer status; e.g.
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see Fig. S2). Economies of scale have a neutral effect when f ≈ 1 or β ≈ 1 but can have a mild mitigating effect when f and β
are both small (Fig. S3). We briefly discuss this effect in context with observed economies of scale in fisheries (Table S1). We
also show how the existence of perfect substitutes (i.e. goods that are indistinguishable from the focal species’ harvest product
to consumers) will tend to prevent profit-driven extinction altogether. Finally, we discuss the implications of non-constant
f and β–in short, extinction still requires f ≥ β (assuming constant ρ and q, and ∂Y
∂E
(
E
Y
)
= 1), at the limits of f and β as
abundance (N) approaches zero.
Other factors–such as intertemporal discounting [27, 28] and opportunistic or multispecies harvesting [29, 30]–can influence
a species’ risk of extinction by overharvesting via different mechanisms, but these are also not the focus of this study.
Review of Empirical Evidence
Our theory suggests that profitable harvesting to extinction requires highly flexible prices, highly inflexible catch rates (implying
inflexible costs), or a combination (f ≥ β, which may be a conservative criterion, given the exacerbating factors not included in
our model). We assume that price flexibility does not directly influence–nor is influenced by–either catch flexibility or the
range-abundance relationship, and thus we review empirical estimates of these three factors separately (Fig. 2), rather than
restricting our analysis to species having estimates of each (there are very few such species).
Price flexibility. To our knowledge, price flexibility (f) estimates for wild terrestrial harvests are rare, perhaps because few
terrestrial harvests of wild animal species are legal and commercial in data-rich countries. One modeling study [31], however,
assumed f = 0.1 for poached elephants. A second study [32] estimated demand elasticity for Serengeti bushmeat to be > 1,
which is consistent with f < 1 with few substitutes.
In contrast, we found 96 published price-flexibility estimates for aquatic harvest products (Fig. 2, Dataset S1)–varying
widely in focal species, commodity type, position in the supply chain (ex-vessel [the price paid to harvesters], wholesale, retail)
and estimation method, including some from high-value species. Most estimated price flexibilities were low (median f = 0.22;
f < 0.5 in 81% of estimates). Estimates of ex-vessel price flexibilities–of primary relevance to our theory–were especially small
(n = 46, median = 0.12, f < 0.5 in 96% of estimates) (Dataset S1). Ex-vessel prices tend to be less flexible than prices further
along the supply chain [33], perhaps because of market power among some wholesale buyers and processors, or because storage
and preservation can buffer retail supplies against changes in harvest rates.
Some high-value aquatic species lack formal price flexibility estimates from in-depth demand analyses, but their price trends
are nonetheless mostly consistent with inflexible prices (f << 1). To illustrate this point, Fig. 3 shows aggregate price-supply
relationships for several populations thought to be facing (or recently have faced) demand-related extinction threats. Bluefin
tunas (Atlantic [ABF] [Thunnus thynnus], Pacific [PBF] [Thunnus orientalis], and Southern [SBT] [Thunnus maccoyii]) have
had relatively stable prices despite abundance declines (Fig. 3A,B; data from refs. [34, 35]). Indeed, Chiang et al. [36]
estimated f = 0.19 for wholesale fresh bluefin tuna (lumped ABF, PBF, and SBT) in Japan. Historical caviar (made from
sturgeon [Acipenseriformes] roe) prices (1976-2010; Fig. 3C; data from ref. [37]) have risen 0.3% on average for every 1%
decline in catch. Before the International Whaling Commission’s moratorium on whaling in the late 1980s, Northeast Atlantic
minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata, a relatively data-rich whale example; data from ref. [38]) prices increased by 0.65%
on average for every 1% decline in catch [Fig. 3D]). California abalone (Haliotis sp.) prices seem to have been more flexible,
increasing by roughly 1% (0.98%) for every 1% decline in catch over the period 1950-1993, before the 1997 ban on fishing
(Fig. 3E) (data from refs. [3, 39]). These historical trends do not necessarily reflect the magnitudes of underlying market-level
price flexibilities, but they are mostly consistent with the pattern of low price flexibility (f < 1) seen in other aquatic harvest
products (Fig. 3F). Controlling for catch, none of these species have residual prices significantly correlated with abundance
(Fig. S2), suggesting that supply-independent rarity effects may indeed be negligible.
Range contraction and catch flexibility. Several studies have directly estimated catch flexibility (β; usually incorporating effects
of both range and other factors) in aquatic populations (see ref. [15] for review), but to our knowledge no such literature
yet exists for terrestrial populations. We found published estimates of catch flexibility from 39 aquatic populations (median
β = 0.56) (Fig. 2; see Dataset S1 for values and references). Of these, 32 (82%) exhibited hyperstability (β < 1), and 14 (36%)
exhibited severe hyperstability (β < 0.5), including 5 of 6 small pelagic finfish populations–which tend to both exhibit schooling
behavior and forage in patchy environments.
For comparison, we compiled estimates of coincident changes in range area and abundance in 142 harvested marine fish and
invertebrate populations (Fig. 4A; see caption for references; full data available in Dataset S1). We use the ratio of coincident
observed percent changes in range and abundance, denoted %∆A/%∆N , as a measure of average ∂A
∂N
(
N
A
)
, which would bound
catch flexibility (β) by inequality 11.
Most of these populations had very abundance-insensitive ranges (median %∆A/%∆N = 0.03) (Fig. 2,4A): for 87 (61%) of
them, the range changed by less than one-tenth of the percent by which abundance changed (|%∆A/%∆N | < 0.1) (see also ref.
[17]). We found %∆A/%∆N > 0.5 (implying β < 0.5) in only 8 (6%) of the populations, half of which were tunas or billfish
(Dataset S1), and we found some evidence suggesting that abundance-sensitive range may be associated with schooling behavior
among tunas (Fig. 4B). Notably, we found hyperaggregation (%∆A/%∆N > 1, implying β < 0) in both ABF and PBF (Fig.
4B), suggesting that these populations would not necessarily need any price flexibility to be profitably harvested to extinction.
In the SI Materials and Methods, we compare the range-abundance relationships from these 142 harvested marine populations
to a taxonomically similar sample from 247 non-harvested marine populations. In the combined sample, we find taxonomy, but
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values and references. Two terrestrial mammal populations having no observed abundance change are excluded.
not harvesting, to be a significant determinant of the range-abundance relationship (SI Materials and Methods, Tables S2, S3,
Figs. S4, S5), suggesting that ecology may be a more important driver. We most commonly find highly abundance-sensitive
ranges (%∆A/%∆N > 0.5) among small invertebrates (molluscs, shrimps) and pelagic finfish in the combined sample (Table
S3).
Our reviews of catch flexibility estimates and range-abundance relationships (Dataset S1) support the hypothesis that
aggregation and patchy habitats lead to hyperstable catches in aquatic species, in part because of range contraction [14, 15].
However, we find catch flexibility (β) estimates to be smaller on average than values implied by range-abundance relationships
alone (Fig. 2), which suggests that other drivers besides range contraction also contribute to hyperstable catch rates. Indeed, a
few studies have directly demonstrated this (e.g., refs. [16, 41] found ∂CPUE
∂D
(
D
CPUE
)
≈ 0.5, where D = N/A, in Atlantic
cod and California kelp bass [Paralabrax clathratus] respectively; see refs. [15, 23] for review).
We found estimates of coincident range and abundance trends for 17 harvested terrestrial mammal and one North American
game bird population (northern bobwhite [Colinus virginianus]) (Fig. 4A; see caption for description of sources; full data
available in Dataset S1). In most (10) of these populations, range contracted at more than half the rate abundance declined
(%∆A/%∆N > 0.5, implying β < 0.5) (Fig. 4A,C). Abundance-sensitive range was most common among large-bodied
mammals; we found hyperaggregation in the Bengal tiger (Panthera tigris) and the Asian elephant (Elephas maximus)–both
species threatened by poaching and habitat destruction [1, 44] (Fig. 4C).
Though this terrestrial sample is quite small, it suggests that terrestrial species might more commonly experience range
contraction as they decline than marine species–a pattern which we also find in a sample of 28 non-harvested bird and mammal
populations (Fig. S5, SI Materials and Methods, Dataset S1). If, like for aquatic species, other factors besides range contraction
further decrease catch flexibility (β) (Fig. 2), many terrestrial species–especially large-bodied mammals, perhaps–could be
susceptible to profitable harvesting to extinction under open access.
Discussion
We find that escalating prices, stable harvest costs, or combinations of these two factors, can, in theory, allow a species to be
profitably harvested to extinction, absent effective protection. Our empirical review suggests that stable harvesting costs might
be a surprisingly common cause of such extinction risks, but this full range of possibilities merits much further attention. Our
review suggests that: (i) range contraction in declining species may be common, and often severe enough to allow extinction
with little or no price flexibility, among terrestrial species, and among aquatic species that school or forage in patchy habitats;
(ii) high price flexibility also occurs among some highly valued aquatic species; and (iii) other factors besides range contraction
also buffer harvest costs against abundance declines. These results suggest that risk factors for abundance-insensitive costs
merit greater attention in harvested species conservation.
Low price flexibility may be common because most harvested commodities have partial substitutes in the market. For
example, studies have found moderate-to-high market substitutability between species within broad classes of fish products
(see ref. [33] for review), including between most tuna species [36, 47]. Species whose harvests have perfect substitutes are
unlikely to be profitably harvested to extinction [26], because perfect substitutes cause the abundance-sensitivity of a species’
price to diminish as it approaches extinction (see SI Materials and Methods). However, our price analyses were restricted to
commercially harvested aquatic species, so the pattern of inflexibility we observed may not necessarily extend to other types of
markets (e.g. black markets).
Our review suggested that range changes may be more correlated with abundance changes among terrestrial species compared
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Atlantic minke whale (production, abundance, prices from ref. [38]), and (E) California abalones (CPUE and prices from refs. [3, 39]). All prices were converted to real USD
value using the World Bank’s [40] published currency exchange and inflation rates. (F) Prices of each of these harvests have historically risen as fast as catch has declined (CA
abalone) or slower (others). Solid lines show linear fits of log-transformed price and production (supply) data, with 95% confidence intervals shaded. Dotted and dashed grey
lines respectively illustrate slopes of -1 (implying 1% increase in price for 1% decrease in production) and -0.5, for reference.
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Fig. 4. Range-abundance relationships for populations of: harvested U.S. marine fish and invertebrates (1970s-2000s; from ref. [42]), tuna and billfish (1960-1999; from refs.
[35, 43]), harvested terrestrial mammals, mostly from the Western Ghats of India (1978/79-2008/09; from ref. [44]; also the African forest elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis) from
2002-2011, ref. [45]), and northern bobwhite (Colinus virginianus), a North American game bird (1966-1993; from ref. [46]). Panel A shows all populations. Panels B and C
show relationships between the maximum catch flexibility (Max. β) and: (B) a proxy for schooling behavior in tunas, and (C) adult body mass in terrestrial mammals (see
Dataset S1). Harvested populations exhibiting hyperaggregation (Max. β < 0) are labeled; all are declining in abundance and range over the time periods in question, except for
Pacific skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), which is increasing. Colored lines in all panels represent linear ordinary least squares (OLS) fits (within large taxonomic groups in
panel A), with 95% confidence intervals shaded. Negative slopes in panels B and C are nearly significant (p < 0.1).
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to marine species (Figs. 4A, S4, S5). This difference may be related to greater habitat destruction and space limitation on
land. Space limitation positively correlates with body size in terrestrial mammals [48, 49], which may explain the especially
strong relationships between range and abundance changes we found in large-bodied mammals. Thus, habitat destruction is
likely a key driver of abundance-insensitive costs on land; and it also may directly and independently add to the extinction risk
faced by terrestrial species. However, given our relatively small and unrepresentative terrestrial samples, these hypotheses
merit further scrutiny.
Aggregating in patchy habitats is common among schooling fish, many small aquatic invertebrates, and other taxa found to
have low catch flexibility, as well as some birds. Aggregation and habitat patchiness are likely key drivers of these species’
susceptibility to both range contraction as they decline (due to concentration in preferred habitats and/or need to maintain
school size [14, 15]) and to some other socioeconomic factors making costs even less sensitive to abundance (e.g. aggregation
predictability [15, 23], harvester coordination [e.g. [50]], use of fish aggregating devices [FADs] [51]). It is ironic that herding
and schooling behaviors, which are considered adaptations for predator avoidance [52], may make such species particularly
prone to extinction from human harvesting.
Together, these results suggest that the harvested species most susceptible to profitable harvesting to extinction may be
those with aggregation behavior, patchy or declining habitats, large home ranges (on land), and few market substitutes [26].
Moreover, our results suggest that–absent management–many high-value harvested species could potentially be threatened by
these risk factors. These include Atlantic and Pacific bluefin tuna (for which we find evidence of hyperaggregation [i.e. β < 0]),
and many large poached land mammals (which likely have low catch flexibility); and may include sturgeons (which face habitat
destruction, e.g. [53]) and high-value marine invertebrates (e.g., abalones, for which we found evidence suggestive of high price
flexibility [Fig. 3E,F]). The extinct passenger pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius), which aggregated in large flocks and suffered
both habitat destruction and overharvesting (e.g. [54]), possibly provides a historical case study of the interaction of these
risk factors in extinction. The susceptibility of some plants (e.g. orchids in southeast Asia, [55]) to overharvesting threats
also merits further study. Because price and catch flexibilities (f, β) can change, a species currently having f > β does not
necessarily face extinction, absent management, but likely does face economic conditions promoting further depletion that
could be severe.
Our analyses assume that species are harvested in an open-access system. Thus, a species we identify as susceptible to
extinction from overharvesting would not necessarily be driven extinct if effective management or property rights that promote
stewardship were implemented. Indeed, there are property rights in many harvests, including some poaching [18] and many
fisheries [56]. Harvests of whales [29], California abalones [39], and bluefin tunas are currently managed; Atlantic bluefin tuna
seems to be recovering [57]. Trade in sturgeons and many mammals is regulated under CITES [13]. It is nonetheless important
to understand how open-access harvesting incentives could lead to extinction, as access restrictions are rarely perfectly enforced;
high-value species are especially vulnerable to illegal harvesting [4].
Materials and Methods
The SI Materials and Methods contains: (i) a glossary of terms, in light of the broad range of topics discussed; (ii) brief discussions of the
effects of economies of scale, technological change, rarity effects, supply-independent price trends, perfect substitutes, and non-constant
price flexibility (f) and catch flexibility (β) on overharvesting threats (Figs. S2, S3); (iii) descriptions of the range and abundance data
shown in Fig. 4; (iv) discussions of observed range-abundance relationships, in relation to taxonomy and harvesting (Tables S2, S3, Figs.
S4, S5); and (v) a review of returns to scale estimates in fisheries (Table S1). Dataset S1 contains all data shown in Figs. 2, 4, S4, and S5,
and their sources.
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SI Materials and Methods 
Glossary of Key Terms 
Hyperstable catch rates occur when catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) decreases proportionally slower than 
abundance as abundance declines, i.e. when catch flexibility (β) is smaller than 1 (21). 
 
Rarity value is consumer value placed on rare species, often because consumption or possession of 
such species confers status (3). 
 
Intertemporal discounting occurs when people consider future consumption or income to be less 
valuable than equal consumption or income in the present. Economic models often assume that 
discounting occurs at a constant compounding annual rate (e.g. 3% per year). 
 
Economies of scale occur when increasing production inputs results in proportionally larger increases 
in output. In our context, economies of scale imply that a one-percent increase in harvest effort (E)—all 
else equal—results in a greater-than-one-percent increase in harvest (Y) ( ∂Y
∂E
E
Y
"
#$
%
&'
>1 ). 
 
Market substitutes, relative to a focal good, are goods that meet a similar need for consumers, and 
therefore are goods that consumers would be willing to consume in place of consuming the focal good 
if prices became more favorable. An increase in the supply of the substitute good causes a reduction in 
the price of the focal good and vice versa. A perfect substitute is indistinguishable from the focal good 
for consumers, and therefore tends to have the same price (58). 
 
 2 
Density-dependent growth occurs when a biological population’s per-capita growth rate changes 
depending on the population’s size. Negative density-dependent growth means that the per-capita 
growth rate decreases with increasing population size, due to, for instance, intra-species competition. 
 
Expanded Theory 
Economies of scale, technological progress, the rarity effect, and supply-independent price trends 
In the theory presented in the main text, we do not explicitly consider factors other than price and catch 
flexibility (f, β) and range changes in driving profitable harvesting to extinction, but we mention 
several potential factors—economies of scale, technological progress, supply-independent rarity 
effects, and supply-independent (and positive, as abundance declines) price trends. We claim that 
economies of scale would have a small mitigating effect on these threats—meaning that conditions on f 
and β for profitable harvesting to extinction would be more restrictive—when f and β were both small 
(illustrated in Figure S3); and that the others would have an exacerbatory effect (meaning the opposite). 
We prove these claims below. 
 
Recall the basic general equations of our model, (1)-(3), and extinction condition (4), from the main 
text: 
Y =Y N,E( ),Y 0,E( ) =Y N, 0( ) = 0   (1) 
!N = Ng N( )−Y   (2) 
!E > <( )  0 if p > <( )  c,  !E = 0 if p = c   (3) 
limN→0
p
c |Ng N( )=Y
"
#
$
%
&
'
>1   (4). 
Consider expanded price and harvest functions: 
p = ρ N, t( )Y − f   (S1) 
Y = q t( )N βEα   (S2). 
Now, ρ is a function of abundance and time and q is a function of time, rather than being constant; and 
harvest (Y) is not necessarily linear in E (i.e. constant returns to scale, ∂Y
∂E
E
Y
"
#$
%
&'
=1 ), and returns to scale 
are instead given by exponent α (also assumed to be constant, for simplicity) ( ∂Y
∂E
E
Y
"
#$
%
&'
=α ).  
 
Expanding on extinction condition (4): 
limN→0
p
c |Ng N( )=Y
"
#
$
%
&
'
= r
1−1
α
− f)
*
+
,
-
. q t( )/0 12
1
α limN→0 ρ N, t( )N
1+β−1
α
− f)
*
+
,
-
."
#
3
$3
%
&
3
'3
>1  (S3). 
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Definitions: I. An economy of scale occurs if α >1 . II. If technological progress occurs, !q > 0 . III. A 
supply-independent rarity effect occurs if ∂ρ
∂N < 0 . IV. A supply-independent and positive price trend if 
∂ρ
∂t > 0 . 
 
With these definitions, our claims, formally, are the following: 
 
Proposition I: Suppose extinction condition (10) holds, i.e. f > β, or f = β  and ρqr− f >1 , where 
ρ = ρ N 0[ ], 0( ) , q = q 0( ) , at the present time (t = 0) and abundance (since they are no longer 
constant as assumed in the main text); the present abundance (N[0]) is assumed to be positive, and 
there are constant returns to scale (α = 1). Then, the general extinction condition (S3) holds if any 
combination of technological progress, the rarity effect, and supply independent and positive price 
trends (each as defined above) occurs. 
 
Proof:  
With constant returns to scale (α = 1), condition (S3) becomes: 
r− f q t( ) limN→0 ρ N, t( )N β− f( ){ }>1   (S4). 
Our claim is that this condition (S3) holds if (but not only if) f > β, or f = β  and 
ρ N 0[ ], 0( )q 0( )r− f >1 . Noticing that limN→0 ρ N, t( ) > 0  because prices are positive and ∂ρ∂N ≤ 0  (
∂ρ
∂N < 0 if there is a rarity effect; 
∂ρ
∂N = 0  otherwise), the left-hand side (LHS) of (S4) approaches ∞ as 
N→ 0 if f > β, satisfying the condition in that case. If f = β and ρ N 0[ ], 0( )q 0( )r− f >1 , we can be sure 
that condition (S4) is satisfied if we can show that: 
q t( ) limN→0 ρ N, t( ){ }≥ q 0( )ρ N 0[ ], 0( )   (S5). 
Because technology is assumed to be either unchanging or progressing ( !q ≥ 0 ), we know that 
q t( ) ≥ q 0( )  for all future times (t > 0). Because current abundance (N[0]) is assumed to be positive, 
∂ρ
∂N ≤ 0  (possible rarity effect) and 
∂ρ
∂t ≥ 0  (possible supply-independent and positive price trend), we 
also know that limN→0 ρ N, t( ){ }≥ ρ N 0[ ], 0( ) . Thus, condition (S5)—and by extension also condition 
(S4)—is satisfied, completing the proof. 
 
Proposition II: For any f and α, there is a critical value of β, denoted β*, such that if β <β* the general 
extinction condition (S3) is satisfied with any combination of positive and finite 
q t( ), r, limN→0 ρ N, t( ){ } ; and (i) β* = f when f = 1; and (ii) β* < f when α > 1, and f < 1.  
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Proof: 
With positive and finite q t( ), r, limN→0 ρ N, t( ){ } , the necessary condition for extinction condition (S3) 
to hold is 1+ β −1
α
− f"
#
$
%
&
' ≤ 0 . Moreover, if 1+ β −1
α
− f"
#
$
%
&
'< 0 , the limit approaches ∞ as N→ 0, meaning 
that,  
1+ β −1
α
− f"
#
$
%
&
'< 0  (S6), 
is a sufficient condition for (S3). 1+ β −1
α
− f"
#
$
%
&
'< 0  if β < β* , given by: 
β* =α f −1( )+1  (S7). 
If f = 1, β* = 1 = f, with any α, proving part (i) of Proposition II. Differentiating β* with respect to α, 
dβ*
dα = f −1  (S8), 
which, given that β* = f when f = 1 or α = 1, implies that, when f < 1, β* < f when α > 1 (economies of 
scale) and β* > f when α < 1 (Figure S3A) (part [ii] of Proposition II). 
 
Proposition III: For any β and α, there is a critical value of f denoted f*, such that if f >f* the general 
extinction condition (S3) is satisfied with any combination of positive and finite 
q t( ), r, limN→0 ρ N, t( ){ } ; and (i) f* = β when β = 1; and (ii) f* > β when α > 1, and β < 1.  
 
Proof: 
The proof of Proposition III mirrors that of Proposition II. Sufficient condition (S6) (for satisfaction of 
extinction condition [S3]) is satisfied if f > f*, with f*given by:  
f * =1+ β −1
α
 (S9). 
If β = 1, f* = 1 = β, with any α, proving part (i). Differentiating f* with respect to α, 
df *
dα =
1−β
α 2
 (S10), 
which, given that f* = β when β = 1 or α = 1, implies that, when β > 1,  f* > β when α > 1 (economies 
of scale) and f* < β when α < 1 (Figure S3B) (part [ii]). 
 
Propositions II and III together imply that economies of scale (α > 1) have a mitigating effect on the 
threat of profitable harvesting to extinction when f, β < 1 because extinction now requires combinations 
of larger f (i.e. greater price-flexibility) and smaller β (lesser catch flexibility). It is worth briefly 
discussing the intuition of these results concerning economies of scale, which is not immediately 
obvious. (In contrast, the reasons technological improvement [which makes harvesting cheaper, all else 
equal], positive price trends, and supply-independent rarity effects should exacerbate the threats should 
be fairly obvious.)  
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Positive returns to scale mean—in our framework—that harvest rate (Y) is more than linearly sensitive 
to changes in harvest effort (E) (and by extension the costs of harvest, because effort is in monetary 
units in our model), i.e. ∂Y
∂E
E
Y
"
#
$
%
&
'=α >1. Conversely, this means that requisite harvest effort/total cost 
(E) is less than linearly sensitive to changes in desired harvest rate, i.e. ∂E
∂Y
Y
E
"
#
$
%
&
'=
1
α
<1. In the extreme 
version of economies of scale, where α = ∞, all harvest rates require the same effort/total cost, i.e. 
∂E
∂Y
Y
E
"
#
$
%
&
'=
1
∞
= 0 . 
 
The extinction criterion (conditions [4] and [S3]) is that there has to be upward pressure on effort (i.e. 
price [p] > average costs [c]) as abundance approaches 0 (N→ 0), at the harvest rates (Y) which exactly 
balance population growth (Ng[N]) (i.e. where Y = Ng[N]). If abundance (N) is small (such that g(N) ≈ 
r) (and assuming, for simplicity, that q and ρ are constant), the harvest rate (Y), effort/total cost (E), 
average cost (c), and price (p), where harvest rates exactly balance population growth (Y = Ng[N]), are 
given by:  
Y|Y=Ng N( ) = Ng N( ) ≈ rN  (S11a), 
E|Y=Ng N( ) = q
−
1
αY
1
αN −
β
α ≈ q−
1
α r
1
αN
1−β
α  (S11b), 
c|Y=Ng N( ) = q
−
1
αY
1
α
−1N −
β
α ≈ q−
1
α r
1
α
−1N
1−β
α
−1
 (S11c), 
p|Y=Ng N( ) = ρY
− f ≈ ρr− f N − f  (S11d). 
Under these conditions, if abundance declines by one percent, then the harvest rate (Y) exactly 
balancing population growth (Ng[N]) decreases by one percent (from eq. [S11a]); the effort/total cost 
(E) required to achieve this harvest rate changes by (β – 1)/α percent (from eq. [S11b]), decreasing if β 
< 1 and increasing if β > 1. The intuition here is that, with constant returns to scale (α = 1), a one-
percent decline in abundance would result in a β-percent increase in the effort needed to achieve the 
same harvest rate (Y), but since the growth-balancing harvest declines by one percent with a one-
percent decline in abundance (assuming abundance is small such that g(N) ≈ r), the net change in effort 
(E) required is (β – 1) percent; it is (β – 1)/α percent with non-constant returns to scale (α), where 
increasing returns to scale (α > 1) diminishes the effects of abundance and yield changes on required 
effort. However, notice that when β = 1 the abundance and yield effects on the required effort cancel 
one another out and returns to scale become irrelevant. When β < 1, the yield effect (reducing the cost 
of growth-balancing harvest as abundance declines) is larger than the abundance effect (increasing the 
cost of growth-balancing harvest as abundance declines). By diminishing this source of cost-
insensitivity to abundance declines, economies of scale (α > 1) have a mitigating effect on threats of 
profitable harvesting to extinction. Conversely decreasing returns to scale (α < 1) would exacerbate the 
cost insensitivity, and therefore the extinction threats. 
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Why does the effect of economies of scale on extinction threats also diminish when f = 1? When 
abundance is small such that g(N) ≈ r, a one-percent decrease in abundance results in a 1+ ([β – 1]/α)-
percent change in average costs (c = E/Y) of a growth-balancing harvest rate (from eq. [S11c])—
coming from a one-percent increase in average costs resulting from a one-percent reduction in the 
growth-balancing harvest rate (eq. [S11a]), and a (β – 1)/α-percent change in effort/total costs (E) (eq. 
[S11b])—and an f-percent increase in the price (at the growth-balancing harvest rate) via a one-percent 
decrease in Y (from eq. [S11d]). If f = 1, then the direct effects of reducing abundance on costs and 
prices cancel out, and the net effect on the price/cost ratio is (β – 1)/α percent; whether or not this net 
effect is positive (i.e. price/cost of the growth-balancing harvest rate increases as abundance decreases, 
which causes extinction [Fig. 1]) is then determined solely by β, specifically by whether β < 1. In 
contrast, if f, β < 1, the net direct effect of a one-percent reduction in abundance on the price/cost ratio 
is negative (f – 1), and an extinction threat depends on this effect being more than balanced out by the 
(1 – β)/α-percent reduction in total costs; economies of scale (α > 1) reduce extinction threats by 
diminishing this effect. 
 
Given the nuanced and potentially important effect of economies of scale on profit-driven extinction 
threats, it is worth briefly considering realistic values. In fisheries, where returns to scale have been 
extensively empirically studied, estimates have tended to be positive (α > 1). Across 15 fisheries for 
which estimates of either α or an equivalent measure of returns to scale (denoted RTS: a composite 
measure used in studies of multiple factors of production [e.g., see ref. 24]) were available, returns to 
scale were on average 1.4 (s.d. = 0.50) (1.40 = RTS ≅ α) (Table S1). With α = 1.4 (and constant q and 
ρ), the extinction criterion becomes, instead of f ≥ β (condition [10]), 
f ≥ 0.29+ 0.71β  (S12). 
Figure S3 compares condition (S12) (dashed black lines) with condition (10) (solid black lines).  
 
Perfect substitutes 
The existence of substitute goods impacts the sensitivity of a population’s harvest price to its supply 
because it potentially reduces a consumer’s willingness to pay a higher price (when they could instead 
shift demand to the substitute) (33). When a substitute is imperfect—meaning that it meets a similar 
need as the focal good for consumers, but consumers do not consider the two goods 
indistinguishable—price flexibility (f) can be estimated without bias if the quantity of the substitute 
good is taken into account, and indeed most studies estimating price flexibility do this (see refs in 
Dataset S1). As a simple example, suppose the price flexibility of population i’s harvest was estimated 
from an equation of form (S13): 
log pit( ) = a− fi log Yit( )+ fik log Ykt( )k∑ + log ρ Xt( )( )   (S13). 
Here, ρ(X) is an unspecified function of other variables (X) impacting prices (e.g., income, etc.), Ykt is 
the supply of good k in time period t, and fik is the cross-price flexibility (the elasticity of the price of 
population i to supply changes in good k). Good k is a substitute if fik < 0. Provided all Ykt are 
 7 
independent of Yit, and no good, k, is a perfect substitute of i, the relationship, 
∂pi
∂Yi
Yi
pi
"
#
$
%
&
'= − fi , and by 
extension extinction criterion (10) would still hold. 
 
However, this would not be the case if the harvest of population i had perfect substitutes. Formally, 
perfect substitutes are defined by the Law of One Price (LOP), which states that perfect substitutes 
must either have identical or proportional equilibrium prices (where any proportional differences result 
from differences in quality or transportation costs that are immune to arbitrage) (33, 58).  The simplest 
test for perfect substitutability between two products, denoted 1 and 2, involves estimating the 
parameters in the following equation: 
log p1( ) = a+ b log p2( )   (S14), 
and testing the hypothesis that b = 1 (perfect substitutability).  This equation can also be used to test a 
hypothesis of no market interaction (b = 0).  Asche et al. (33, 58) review other methods for testing for 
substitutability (often referred to more broadly as ‘market integration’ in economic studies, as the LOP 
depends on both equivalence of products for consumers and ease of arbitrage between markets in a 
spatial sense) that can allow for non-stationarity in prices and other dynamic complexities, when longer 
unbroken time-series data are available. 
 
Identifying perfect substitutes is important for two reasons. First, if a good, k, is a perfect substitute for 
harvest of a population, i (i.e. the LOP holds), then treating them as separate products creates bias in 
estimating fi (even if log(Yk) is included in the regression, for example), as the ‘true’ fi will vary with 
the supply of the perfect substitute good at each time period.  Second, and more fundamentally, if 
harvest of population i is part of a set of populations producing equivalent harvests (denoted S), then 
the price responds to changes in the total supply of harvest of all populations in S.  In other words, 
price flexibility, fi, would really describe:    
fi =
∂pi
∂ Ykk=1
S
∑( )
Ykk=1
S
∑
pi
#
$
%
%
&
'
(
( ≠
∂pi
∂Yi
Yi
pi
#
$
%
&
'
(   (S15). 
Given that Yi→0 as Ni→0, it follows from equation (S15) that (δpi/δNi)→0 as Ni→0, eliminating the 
threat of price-driven extinction, if there are other more common populations or products which are 
perfect substitutes (i.e. Yk > 0, for at least one k).  Thus, with respect to price-driven extinction threats, 
a group of populations whose harvests are perfect substitutes are only as weak as their strongest (i.e. 
most slowly depleted) member.  This result may have important implications for rare fish species that 
are aquacultured. However the assumption that aquaculture is a perfect substitute for wild harvest 
remains untested for most species, and evidence so far suggests that perfect substitutability may be rare 
(59). 
 
Non-constant price and catch flexibility (f, β) 
Consider the original price (p) and cost (c) functions [(6), (8)] from the main text, and extinction 
condition (4), but assuming now that f and β are non-constant—for example, potentially dependent on 
harvest (Y), abundance (N) or time (t).  
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p = ρY − f Y ,N ,t( )   (S16) 
c = q−1N −β Y ,N ,t( )   (S17). 
limN→0
ρY − f Y ,N ,t( )
q−1N −β Y ,N ,t( )
|Ng N( )=Y
#
$
%
&%
'
(
%
)%
= ρq limN→0 r− f rN ,N ,t( )N β rN ,N ,t( )− f rN ,N ,t( ){ }>1   (S18). 
For extinction condition (S18) to hold, the equivalent of extinction condition (10) (
f > β, or f = β  and ρqr− f >1 ) must hold at the limit as N→0 where Y = Ng(N), assuming the limit of 
f(rN, N, t) as N→0 is finite. One corollary of this result, for example, is that linear demand (i.e. p = a – 
bY, where a and b are constants, implying f Y,N, t( ) = − ∂p
∂Y
Y
p
#
$
%
&
'
(=
bY
a− bY ) could only allow extinction 
with either hyperaggregation or abundance-decoupled CPUE at the limit as N→0 where Y = Ng(N) (i.e. 
limN→0 β Y,N, t( ) |Ng N( )=Y{ }≤ 0 ) because limN→0 f Y,N, t( ) |Ng N( )=Y{ }= r limN→0
bN
a− brN
#
$
%
&
'
(
= 0 . 
 
Data Description  
The range and abundance data shown in Figs. 4, S4, and S5 and Tables S2 and S3 come from the 
following sources: Pinsky et al. (42) (U.S. fish and invertebrates), Worm and Tittensor (43) (global 
tunas and billfish range changes), Ricard et al. (35) (global tunas and billfish abundance changes), 
Pillay et al. (44) (terrestrial mammals in the Western Ghats of India), Maisels et al. (45) (African forest 
elephant, Loxodonta cyclotis), Rodríguez (46) (North American birds). 
 
We compared estimates from U.S. trawl surveys (42) of the range and abundance changes from the 
1970s to the 2000s from 367 well-sampled fish and invertebrate populations, each having abundance 
changes between -100% and 100% (Fig. 4A) (we restricted our sample in this way to remove outliers 
with very large abundance increases and to give declining and increasing populations equal weight).  
We calculated range as the number of 0.5°x0.5° grid cells occupied by a species in a given decade. To 
help correct for false absences, we excluded cells in which a survey did not have a high (≥99%) chance 
of detecting a species if it was present. We calculated abundance as the stratified mean catch per trawl 
tow in a decade. 
 
We compared estimates of range changes from the 1960s to the 1990s of 22 tuna and billfish 
populations (43) to estimates from the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment Database (35) of the abundance 
change in each population (in units of total biomass) over the same period (Fig. 4A,B, Fig. S4A).  
Multiple populations of the same species in the same ocean were aggregated to be compatible with 
Worm & Tittensor’s (43) ocean-wide range change estimates. Estimated range changes in SBT were 
averaged across all 3 oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, Indian).  
 
We compared estimates of range and abundance from 1978-79 to 2008-2009 of 18 terrestrial mammal 
populations from the Western Ghats of India (44) (Fig. 4A,C, S4B). We used Pillay et al.’s (44) 
measure of occupancy as a proxy for range area, and detectability as a proxy for abundance, as they 
intended (see their Table 2). We used estimates of percent change in range and abundance reported in 
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Maisels et al. (45) for the African forest elephant (2002-2011) (see their Abstract), and reported in 
Table 2 of Rodríguez (46) for 27 bird populations from North America (1966-1993). Body mass 
estimates for terrestrial mammals came from Pillay et al. (44) for the 18 populations in their analysis, 
and from University of Michigan Animal Diversity Web 
(http://animaldiversity.org/accounts/Loxodonta_cyclotis/) for the African forest elephant. For birds, 
they came from the Cornell Ornithology Lab (https://www.allaboutbirds.org/). 
 
The literature estimates of β and f are listed in full in Dataset S1. Estimates of returns to scale, and 
related references, are listed in Table S1. 
 
Effects of harvesting and taxonomy on the range-abundance relationship 
In our empirical analysis in the main text of range-abundance relationships (Figs. 2, 4), we only 
included populations from the above-described samples that are harvested (n = 160), despite our data 
sources also including many species that are not harvested (n = 275). For the purposes of this analysis, 
we defined a marine population as ‘harvested’ if it had catches reported to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/en)—with this 
definition identifying 142/389 populations as harvested and 247/389 as not harvested. We note that 
some populations, which are caught primarily in small-scale recreational, subsistence, or Indigenous 
traditional harvests, are incorrectly designated not harvested by this method, but there is still a 
commercial vs. non-commercial harvesting distinction in these cases. We classified the terrestrial 
mammals and birds as ‘harvested’ or ‘not harvested’ according to whether or not their IUCN Red List 
assessment (1) mentions harvesting as a threat. With this classification, only one of 27 birds is 
harvested (northern bobwhite [Colinus virginianus]) and 17 of the 19 mammals are harvested (dhole 
[Cuon alpinus], golden jackal [Canis aureus] are the two populations not harvested). 
 
We briefly examine the full dataset here, to ask: (i) whether harvesting is a significant determinant of 
the range-abundance relationship, and (ii) whether the broad-scale difference we seem to see in the 
smaller sample, between the strengths of range-abundance relationships of marine and terrestrial 
populations, also hold up in the larger sample. In the marine species, both harvested and non-harvested 
populations had similar taxonomic coverage (the tunas and billfish in our sample—all of which are 
harvested—were a noteworthy exception). 
 
We tested for an effect of harvesting (our binary definition) on the range-abundance relationship using 
ordinary least squares (OLS); we regressed the percent change in range area (%ΔA) on combinations of 
the percent change in abundance (%ΔN), harvested status (a binary variable, as described above), 
taxonomic group (see Table S3 for marine taxonomic group definitions; terrestrial species were 
classified simply as either mammals or birds), and their interactions. In all models, we found harvested 
status, and its interaction with percent change in abundance (%ΔN) (which measures the effect of 
harvested status on the relationship between range change and abundance change), to be non-
significant explanatory variables (p > 0.05) (Table S2, Fig. S4). This may suggest that ecological 
factors (such as aggregation behavior and habitat patchiness) or other human-caused factors (such as 
habitat loss and climate change) are often the primary drivers of range-abundance relationship, but this 
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hypothesis merits further scrutiny. In Table S3, we compare the fractions of various marine taxa having 
percent range changes greater than half the their percent abundance changes (%ΔA/%ΔN > 0.5). 
Pelagic finfish (including tunas and billfish) and small invertebrates most commonly had %ΔA/%ΔN > 
0.5. Differences between demersal and coastal finfish, and tunas and billfish and small molluscs were 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) according to Fisher’s exact test.   
 
The significant contrast in the strength of range-abundance relationships of marine vs. terrestrial 
populations—with stronger relationships among terrestrial populations (Fig. 4A)—persists in the larger 
sample including both harvested and non-harvested populations (Fig. S5, Dataset S1). Indeed, this 
contrast persists and is similar when comparing either marine fish or marine invertebrates, to either 
terrestrial mammals or terrestrial birds (Fig. S5). 
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Table S1. Estimates of returns to scale (α, RTS) in fisheries, with references.  
Fishery Parameter Value Reference(s) 
NSW Ocean prawn trawl 
fishery 
RTS 2.6 
Greenville J, Hartmann J, Macauley 
TG (2006) Technical efficiency in 
input-controlled fisheries: The NSW 
ocean prawn trawl fishery. Mar 
Resour Econ 21: 159-179. 
Alaska pollock (pre-
American Fisheries Act) 
RTS 1.95 
Torres MO, Felthoven RG (2014) 
Productivity growth and product 
choice in catch share fisheries. Mar 
Pol 50: 280-289. 
Lofoten (Norway) saithe  RTS 1.94 
Hannesson R (1983) Bioeconomic 
production function in fisheries: 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
Can J Fish Aquat Sci 40: 968-982. 
Hawaii longline RTS 1.87 
Sharma KR, Leung P (1999) 
Technical efficiency of the longline 
fishery in Hawaii: An application of a 
stochastic production frontier. Mar 
Resour Econ 13: 259-274. 
Mid-Atlantic sea scallop RTS 1.73 
Kirkley JE, Squires D, Strand IE 
(1995) Assessing technical efficiency 
in commercial fisheries: The mid-
Atlantic sea scallop fishery. Am J Ag 
Econ 77: 686–697. 
Mid-Atlantic ocean quahog RTS 1.51 
Weninger Q (1998) Assessing 
efficiency gains from individual 
transferable quotas: An application to 
the mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean 
quahog fishery. Am J Ag Econ 80: 
750-764. 
Iranian Persian Gulf fishery  RTS 1.42 
Esmaeili A (2006) Technical 
efficiency analysis for the Iranian 
fishery in the Persian Gulf. ICES J 
Mar Sci 63: 1759-1764. 
North Sea herring (24, 73) α, RTS 1.40* 
Bjørndal T, Conrad JM (1987) The 
dynamics of an open access fishery. 
Can J Econ 20: 74-85. 
Bjorndal T (1989) Production in a 
schooling fishery: The case of the 
North Sea herring fishery. Land Econ 
65: 49-56. 
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Alaska pollock (post-
American Fisheries Act) 
RTS 1.07 
Torres MO, Felthoven RG (2014) 
Productivity growth and product 
choice in catch share fisheries. Mar 
Pol 50: 280-289. 
Mid-Atlantic surf clam RTS 1.04 
Weninger Q (1998) Assessing 
efficiency gains from individual 
transferable quotas: An application to 
the mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean 
quahog fishery. Am J Ag Econ 80: 
750-764. 
Lofoten (Norway) cod  RTS 1.06 
Hannesson R (1983) Bioeconomic 
production function in fisheries: 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
Can J Fish Aquat Sci 40: 968-982. 
Pacific halibut  RTS 1 
Comitini S, Huang DS (1967) A 
study of production and factor shares 
in the halibut fishing industry. J Poli 
Econ 75: 366-372. 
Australian Southeast trawl 
fishery  
RTS 0.99 
Kompas T, Che TN (2005) Efficiency 
gains and cost reductions from 
individual transferable quotas: A 
stochastic cost frontier for the 
Australian south east fishery. J Prod 
Anal 23: 285-307. 
Solomon Islands pole and 
line fishery 
RTS 0.96 
Campbell HF, Hand AJ (1998) Joint 
ventures and technology transfer: the 
Solomon Islands pole-and-line 
fishery. J Devel Econ 57: 421-442. 
Swedish trawl fishery for 
Norway lobster 
RTS 0.92 
Eggert H (2000) Technical efficiency 
in the Swedish trawl fishery for 
Norway lobster. IIFET 2000 
Proceedings. Available from 
http://oregonstate.edu/dept/IIFET/200
0/papers/eggert.pdf 
448 (Accessed April 25, 2016). 
NE Atlantic minke whale α 0.865 
Amundsen ES, Bjorndal T, Conrad 
JM (1995) Open access harvesting of 
the northeast Atlantic minke whale. 
Environ Res Econ 6: 167-185. 
Mean (S.D.) 
 
1.40 (0.50)  
*Mean of two estimates. 
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Table S2. Results of OLS regressions of range change (%ΔA) on combinations of: abundance change 
(%ΔN), harvested status (for marine species: ‘Y’ if species has an FAO capture record, ‘N’ otherwise; 
for terrestrial species: ‘Y’ if species’ IUCN Red List assessment lists harvesting as a threat, ‘N’ = 
otherwise), taxonomic group (defined as in Table S3 for marine species, ‘mammal’ or ‘bird’ for 
terrestrial species), and interactions. Marine and terrestrial species are modeled separately, and two 
outliers are excluded in the terrestrial analysis (lark sparrow [Chondestes grammacus] and Brewer’s 
blackbird [Euphagus cyanocephalus], similarly to Figs. S4 and S5). Each row in the table represents a 
separate regression model, with its explanatory variables indicated (italicized explanatory variables had 
significant effects on range change [%ΔA]  [p < 0.05]), and the effect size (on range change [%ΔA]) of 
harvesting and its interaction with abundance change (%ΔN) indicated along with the corresponding p 
value. In all models, the harvesting effect was not found to be significant. 
Marine/ 
Terrestrial 
Explanatory Variables Harvesting Effect [N] 
(p value) 
(Harvesting [N]) x  
(%ΔN) Effect (p value) 
Marine Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Harvested? 
-0.36 (0.57) N/A 
Marine Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Harvested?, (%ΔN) x 
Harvested? 
-0.34 (0.58) 0.017 (0.14) 
Marine Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Taxonomic Group, 
Harvested? 
-0.045 (0.50) N/A 
Marine Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Taxonomic Group, 
Harvested?, (%ΔN) x 
Harvested? 
-0.41 (0.53) -0.016 (0.16) 
Marine Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Taxonomic Group,  
(%ΔN)xTaxonomic Group, 
Harvested? 
-0.62 (0.34) N/A 
Terrestrial Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Harvested? 
-0.85 (0.56) N/A 
Terrestrial Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Harvested?, (%ΔN) x 
Harvested? 
-0.73 (0.61) -0.098 (0.30) 
Terrestrial Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Taxonomic Group, 
Harvested? 
4.5 (0.07) N/A 
Terrestrial Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Taxonomic Group, 
Harvested?, (%ΔN) x 
Harvested? 
4.2 (0.088) -0.051 (0.57) 
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Terrestrial Abundance change (%ΔN), 
Taxonomic Group,  (%ΔN) 
x Taxonomic Group, 
Harvested? 
4.5 (0.087) N/A 
 
 
 
Table S3. Distributions of range-abundance relationships (measured by %ΔA/%ΔN) among marine 
populations by taxonomic group (sorted by fraction of populations with %ΔA/%ΔN > 0.5). Superscript 
letters denote pairwise significant differences (p < 0.05) between taxonomic groups in the fraction of 
populations with %ΔA/%ΔN > 0.5, calculated using Fisher’s exact test. The “Small pelagic finfish” 
category includes FAO ISSCAAP (ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/STAT/DATA/ASFIS_structure.pdf) categories 
“Shads” and “Herrings, sardines, anchovies”; the “Demersal and coastal finfish” category includes 
FAO ISSCAAP categories “Cods, hakes, haddocks”, “Flounders, halibuts, soles”, “Salmons, trouts, 
smelts”, “Miscellaneous coastal fishes”, and “Miscellaneous demersal fishes”. 
Taxonomic Group 
Number of 
Populations 
Fraction with 
%ΔA/%ΔN > 0.5 
Median %ΔA/%ΔN   
(25th pct., 75th pct.) 
Molluscs (excl. squids, 
cuttlefishes, octopuses) 
18 0.28a,b 0.11 (0.04, 0.58) 
Tunas, billfishes 23 0.17a,b 0.08 (0.00, 0.31) 
Small pelagic finfish 12 0.17a,b,c 0.10 (–0.02, 0.34) 
Other 13 0.15a,b,c 0.00 (–0.13, 0.14) 
Other pelagic finfish 38 0.13a,b,c 0.01 (–0.04, 0.20) 
Shrimps, prawns 21 0.095a,b,c 0.00 (–0.03, 0.10) 
Demersal and coastal 
finfish 
230 0.052c 0.00 (–0.01, 0.09) 
Other crustaceans 23 0b,c 0.00 (–0.06, 0.03) 
Squids, cuttlefishes, 
octopuses 
11 0a,b,c 0.00 (–0.05, 0.14) 
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Figures 
 
Figure S1. Isoclines and directions of change depicted in N-E phase plane for different values of β and 
f. Panel A illustrates the general concept of the isoclines; panels B and C illustrate the effects on the 
isoclines of varying values of β and f, respectively; and panels D and E illustrate scenarios in which 
extinction is possible, where f > β (D) or f = β (E). Open and filled circles in A, D and E denote 
unstable and potentially stable (cycling) equilibria, respectively. Because both E and N are bounded 
and the phase plane is two-dimensional, the dynamics of N and E must eventually reach the origin 
(extinction), the filled equilibrium point, or a limit cycle. Extinction is possible when the E isocline 
(red) lies above the N isocline at the limit when N approaches zero (equivalent to condition [4] in the 
main text). 
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Figure S2. Historical relationships between price (p) and abundance (N), controlling for production 
(Y), for four of the populations analyzed in Fig. 3 (caviar not shown here due to lack of abundance 
information). None of these relationships were significant, suggesting price flexibility (f) may capture 
rarity effects for these products. 
 
 
 
Figure S3. The impact of economies of scale (α > 1) on the critical values of (A) β and (B) f needed 
for an extinction, illustrated with α = 1.4 (dashed, see Table S1) and α = 1 (solid, constant returns to 
scale). 
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Figure S4. Range-abundance relationships of (A) marine fish and invertebrates, and (B) terrestrial 
mammals and birds, comparing harvested (blue) and non-harvested (red) populations. Lines indicate 
linear OLS fits within each group (harvested vs. not harvested), with 95% confidence intervals shaded. 
Two outliers among the birds were excluded in these fits, as indicated in Dataset S1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S5. Range-abundance relationships of all populations—both harvested and not harvested—for 
which data were available. Lines indicate linear OLS fits within each large taxonomic group, with 95% 
confidence intervals shaded, as indicated. Two outliers among the birds were excluded in these fits, as 
indicated in Dataset S1.  
 
 
